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 Uses a database of car owners to analyze impacts of a congestion tax on car ﬂeet.
 Results show that the tax had a signiﬁcant effect on ethanol car purchases.
 Prior ownership of ethanol car and education correlates with ethanol car purchases.
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a b s t r a c t
Policymakers have made several attempts to introduce local and national policies to reduce CO2
emissions and stimulate the consumer adoption of alternative fuel vehicles (ethanol/E85 cars). The
purpose of this paper is to analyze how a local policy measure impacts the composition of the car ﬂeet
over time. More speciﬁcally, we take advantage of the natural experiment setting caused by the
introduction of the Stockholm congestion tax (2006) to analyze how the tax affected purchases of
ethanol cars that were exempted from the tax. To estimate effects, we employ a Difference-in-differences
methodology. By using a comprehensive database of the car ﬂeet and car owners, sociodemographic and
geographic factors are analyzed, which is unique in the existing literature. Our results suggest that the
congestion tax had a signiﬁcant impact on ethanol car purchases although the effect fades away over
time. Furthermore, there is a positive relationship between the level of education and ethanol car
purchases. Previous adoption of an ethanol car is found to be the strongest predictor of ethanol car
purchases. Finally, data indicate that Stockholmers substantially increased purchases of ethanol cars half
a year before the introduction of the congestion tax, which we refer to as an anticipation effect.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
In 2010 the transportation sector accounted for 22% of world-
wide CO2 emissions and approximately three quarters of these
were due to road trafﬁc (IEA, 2012). Decreasing the emissions of
car trafﬁc and making the car ﬂeet less dependent on fossil oil has
been the goal of international agencies and national governments
for many years, and it has also spurred an interest in ﬁnding the
most effective policies for shifting the car ﬂeet towards increased
environmental sustainability. Based on a unique set of register
data, we compare the development in the consumer adoption of
alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs; speciﬁcally ethanol/E85 cars) in
the three largest cities of Sweden following the introduction of the
Stockholm congestion tax in 2006. We are able to estimate the
effect of the congestion tax on car purchasing behavior since
ethanol cars were exempt from the congestion tax between 2006
and 2009. Thus, although the introduction of the congestion tax
was not explicitly aimed at people's car choices, it provides a
natural experiment for testing the effectiveness of economic
incentives on the purchasing of AFVs. In addition, the dataset
permits the uncovering of more socio-economic factors of AFV
adopters and non-adopters than reported in previous studies.
The Stockholm congestion tax is one of several national and
local policies aimed at decreasing congestion but also increasing
consumer adoption of AFVs and sales of alternative fuels such as
bioethanol and gas. As an over-arching goal for the transport
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sector, the Swedish Parliament has set a target for zero greenhouse
gas emissions in 2050 and a milestone of having a fossil oil
independent car ﬂeet by 2030 (Regeringskansliet, 2009). Further-
more, Sweden was the ﬁrst country in Europe to create incentives
for ethanol/E851 cars through tax breaks on the fuel as well as a
law mandating fueling stations to invest in pumps for alternative
fuels2 (Riksrevisionen, 2011). According to a government regula-
tion adopted in 2004, “environment cars3” are ﬂexible fuel
vehicles that can run on ethanol, electricity or biogas provided
that they, when driven on gasoline, do not emit more than 218 g
CO2 per km (SFS, 2004: 1364). In addition, diesel cars and gasoline
cars that emit less than 120 g CO2 per km were also labeled
"environment cars", but only cars that run on ethanol, electricity
or gas were exempted from the Stockholm congestion tax. As
shown in Fig. 1, at a national level these policies appear to have
had a substantial effect on car purchases since 2004. Early on,
ethanol cars dominated the “environment car” market. For exam-
ple, in 2008 ethanol cars had a 68% share of the “environment car”
market (corresponding to a 23% share of the total car purchases
that year (Bil Sweden, 2013)). Since 2009, low CO2-emitting diesel
and gasoline cars have taken over as the most sold “environment
cars” (e.g., Kågeson, 2012). Fig. 1 shows that the total market for
“environment cars” expanded from 3% of all new car sales in 2004
to 45% in 2012, but it can also be concluded that ethanol cars have
dropped over time as other types of “environment cars” have been
introduced and become popular among consumers.
Although some evaluations of policies targeting the sales of
biofuels and AFVs in Sweden have been conducted, most of them
are partial or merely adopting a descriptive approach (e.g., City of
Stockholm, 2009; Riksrevisionen, 2011). Hence, it is difﬁcult to draw
more speciﬁc conclusions as to how a speciﬁc policy such as the
Stockholm congestion tax is linked to changes in the car ﬂeet over
time and about what factors that can explain the adoption of more
environmentally friendly vehicles. From a research perspective, there
is a wealth of published studies using different types of survey
methods to clarify barriers and drivers of consumer adoption of AFVs
(Diamond, 2009; Egbue and Long, 2012; Ozaki and Sevastyanova,
2011). Some studies have also utilized panel data (e.g., Ryan et al.,
2009) to model the CO2 intensity of the new car ﬂeet, but this study
did not analyze AFV adoption as such. However, there are no
published studies based on register data that pool demographic and
time series data in order to produce a more nuanced picture of how
policies inﬂuence the car ﬂeet depending on local or non-local policy
to reduce environmental impact using alternative fuels.
To our knowledge there is yet no study of AFV adoption based
on representative panel data with information on socio-economics
and demographics. This type of analysis may add important
insights to the existing knowledge of incentive mechanisms
behind changes in AFV adoption. The purpose of the paper is to
contribute to the understanding of how selective taxes and
population characteristics inﬂuence the composition of the car
ﬂeet against this background. More speciﬁcally, our aim is to
estimate the causal link between tax exemptions for AFVs and
purchases of such vehicles, and to describe the socio-economic
and demographic characteristics of AFV consumers. We do this by
utilizing a natural experiment created by the introduction of the
congestion tax in Stockholm (Sweden) in 2006. Since this tax was
not introduced anywhere else in Sweden until 2013, and since
ethanol/E85 cars were exempted from the tax, we are able to
estimate how the tax affected incentives to purchase ethanol cars.
Our rich register data further allows us to estimate the correlation
between socio-economic and demographic characteristics and
ethanol car purchases.
1.1. The Stockholm congestion tax and the exemption for AFVs: a
natural experiment
Research has pointed towards policies as important factors behind
the composition and development of the car ﬂeet (e.g., de Haan et al.,
2006; Potter and Parkhurst, 2005). Today, CO2 taxation is well
established in large parts of the European Union. Nineteen EUMember
States (ACEA, 2012), among them Sweden, currently apply some form
of CO2 tax to the registration and/or ownership of passenger cars,
based on the car's CO2 emissions and/or fuel consumption. There are,
for example, vehicle taxes such as the annual vehicle tax. These types
of taxes affect the entire car ﬂeet and aim to give incentives to choose
more fuel-efﬁcient cars (Ryan et al., 2009). In addition to the national
taxation schemes there are also local taxes and subsidies implemented
to attempt to steer the car ﬂeet in less environmentally harmful and
less fossil fuel intensive directions.4 Local policies that affect the
composition of the car ﬂeet are exemption from congestion tolls and
free parking for cars that pollute less.
During recent years, several policies have been implemented in
Sweden in order to increase the adoption of AFVs and fuel-
efﬁcient cars. From 2007 to 2009 a national cleaner car purchase
rebate was enacted that subsidized the purchase price of all new
AFVs with SEK 10,000 (approximately 1000 Euros). Furthermore, a
congestion tax was introduced in Stockholm in 2006, initially as a
six-month trial. After close monitoring of trafﬁc patterns and
public opinions and a referendum in and around Stockholm city,
the tax was made permanent in August 2007. According to
Börjesson et al. (2012) the tax had both immediate and longer
term effects on decreasing trafﬁc congestion. In their study they
also found that the tax had a considerable effect on the sale of
AFVs due to the fact that these vehicles were exempted from the
tax (to varying degrees) up until 2012 (Börjesson et al., 2012). In a
national comparison they also show that the sales of AFVs in
Stockholm were higher than the Swedish average in 2006 and
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Fig. 1. The proportions of different types of environment cars of all environment
car purchases in Sweden 2004–2012, and the total share of all environment car
purchases of all car sales. New car registrations per year (Bil Sweden, 2013).
1 E85 is a blend of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline (summer quality; in the
winter the mix is 75/25). It is the most commonly available blended fuel for use in
ﬂex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) in Sweden. In this paper we refer to cars that can run on
E85 as ethanol cars.
2 By the end of 2011 there were 2885 fueling stations in Sweden and 59% of
these sold E85 (SBPI, 2013).
3 The term “environment car” has been used by the Swedish legislators and is
not a term invented or endorsed in this paper.
4 It should be noted that these vehicle taxes impose a ﬁxed cost on car
ownership and therefore probably have very little effect on how the car is actually
used, i.e., how much emission it produces. Hence, from an economics perspective,
these policies are seen as second best; a unit tax on the CO2 content in fuels would
likely be a more cost-effective policy.
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2008, and nearly the same for 2007. In total, exempting the AFVs
from the tax seems to have had a positive effect on the sales of
these vehicles together with other local (free residential parking)
and national incentives (such as the tax exemption on renewable
fuels and the national purchase subsidy for cleaner vehicles). This
seems to be particularly the case on car sales to companies, which
accounted for 91% of the bought “green cars” (AFVs and cars
emitting less than 120 g of CO2/km) according to Börjesson et al.
(2012). Although the studies by Börjesson et al. (2012) and
Eliasson and Jonsson (2011) concerning the Stockholm congestion
tax are important for understanding Trafﬁc Demand Management
(TDM) measures and sales of so called “environment cars”, their
estimation techniques do not allow for causal inference, since it
does not include a counter-factual development. In other words,
without an adequate control group, we cannot say to what extent
congestion and the composition of the car ﬂeet in Stockholm
would have changed in the absence of the tax. Indeed, since
Stockholm had a higher than the national average sale of “green
cars” even before the introduction of the tax, the increase after
2006 may only represent a continuation of this trend. In addition,
previous research does not offer insight into which types of
consumers bought “environment cars”. Finally, Börjesson et al.
(2012) and Eliasson and Jonsson (2011) study both private and
company car purchases lumped together. Since the tax models for
private and company purchase of cars differ, and since individual
consumers and companies are likely to differ in terms of behavior,
there are probably different driving forces behind car purchases in
these two groups.
This paper contributes to the literature on AFV diffusion (and
ethanol cars in particular) in three distinct ways. First, in contrast
to previous research that commonly estimates correlations
between AFV adoption and policy, we utilize the natural experi-
ment created by the Stockholm congestion tax to estimate causal
effects between policy and consumer behavior. Second, having
access to a uniquely rich register dataset allows us to analyze
previously uncovered factors, such as heterogeneity among con-
sumers in terms of socio-economic and socio-demographic char-
acteristics associated with AFV adoption. By focusing solely on
private car purchases the third contribution refers to the analysis
of the mechanisms behind adoption among private persons with-
out interference from corporate sector purchases. This is impor-
tant since company car purchases have different tax regulations
and probably also involve other preferences compared to the
household sector.
1.2. Consumer characteristics and the adoption of AFVs
As examples of AFVs we use ethanol cars, since they have
accounted for a majority of new purchases of AFVs in Sweden
during our period of investigation (2004-2008) see Fig. 1.
There are a wealth of studies on socio-economic factors on the
household/family and individual levels related to consumer adop-
tion (Hunecke et al., 2007) and how these affect car purchases. In
this respect, income, gender, education, age and civil status appear
to have some inﬂuence, although the explanatory ability of these
factors is often found to be relatively low.
Previous research has found that high-income households
value AFVs higher than conventional cars (Dagsvik and Liu,
2009) and that females, minorities, and residents in urban areas
exhibit higher demands for fuel-efﬁcient cars (McCarthy and Tay,
1998). Males have been found to have a higher stated choice of
hydrogen vehicles (Ziegler, 2012), whereas females and owners of
new cars are signiﬁcantly more concerned with the environmental
performance of the car (Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson,
2006). Moreover, old people seem to be signiﬁcantly more con-
cerned with the environmental performance of the car
(Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 2006), but at the same time,
age seems negatively related to greenhouse gas emissions from
transportation (Hunecke et al., 2007). Finally, higher education
seems to have a signiﬁcant positive effect on the stated choice of
hybrid vehicles (Potoglou and Kanaroglou, 2007) and AFVs
(Jansson et al., 2011). Furthermore, in other studies there seems
to be no effect of education on the willingness to choose an AFV
(Zhang et al., 2011; Ziegler, 2012). According to a recent Euro-
barometer (EC, 2011), Swedes are the most concerned about
climate change in the EU and Swedish citizens are reported to
have the most positive attitudes to environmentally friendly
transportation in the EU. Thus, both the tax incentive schemes
and the consumer preferences make Sweden an interesting case
for a study of the diffusion of AFVs. Due to differences in
preferences, there is probably a heterogeneity which can be
examined by using register data. This approach will be further
elaborated.
2. Material and methods
In order to evaluate the effect of the Stockholm congestion tax,
we employ a Difference-in-differences approach (described in
detail below) for the period 2004–2008. Our data consists of a
random sample of individuals living in one of the three biggest
cities in Sweden: Stockholm, Gothenburg or Malmö, where
Gothenburg and Malmö function as control groups. The choice of
control groups is partly justiﬁed by the resemblance in population
size (all three being metropolitan areas as compared to other cities
in Sweden), and partly by the fact that Gothenburg actually
implemented a similar tax in 2013 while Malmö is still lacking
congestion taxes. The difference in timing of implementation
creates a natural experiment, which in turn enables a more
accurate estimation of the effects of a congestion tax.
In order to capture effects on individuals that do not live in the
city center in the metropolitan areas, but may be affected by the
congestion tax (e.g., via work), we also include individuals living in
neighboring municipalities. The choice of these neighboring
municipalities follows the classiﬁcation of Statistics Sweden. The
distance between the three cities is: Stockholm-Malmö: 619 km;
Stockholm–Gothenburg; 478 km, Malmö–Gothenburg; 276 km.
The dataset available for analyses is a compilation of register
data of the entire Swedish population collected by Statistics
Sweden. Individual-level record linkages between demographic
and socioeconomic attributes in combination with car ownership
make the foundation for the empirical analyses. This implies that
car-related attributes like brand, model, registration date, fuel
type, motor capacity, emissions etc. are linked to the individual
(owner) and can be viewed together with his/her demographic
(e.g. sex, age, and family situation) and socioeconomic (e.g. education
level, earnings, housing, and labor market situation) characteristics.
Since the dataset covers the entire population over the last 25 years
we can observe car ownership of all private persons, which corre-
sponds to a vast share of all cars in the country.
In 2012 there were about 4.4 million cars in Sweden, corre-
sponding to 464 cars per 1000 inhabitants (480 in EU-25). Almost
80% of the cars in Sweden are owned privately. The regions of
Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö account for 48% of these cars
(Traﬁkanalys, 2013). Car owners in Sweden are predominantly
male (65% in 2012), and the average annual driving distance is
12,118 km. The share of the population having a driver's license for
passenger car was 78% at the end of 2011 (Stockholm: 69%,
Gothenburg: 79%, Malmö: 76%). To enable an econometric analysis
of the material, we use a random sample of 100,000 individuals in
Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö respectively. The population
from which this sample is drawn is the total population of the
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three cities. These individuals are followed during the entire time
period. Since only individuals over the age of 18 are eligible to
drive a car in Sweden, we only conduct our analysis on individuals
at or above the age of 18 in our sample. This implies that some
individuals, who were below the age of 18 in 2004 but turns 18
sometime during the time period under study, enter into our
sample in the year s/he comes of age. In combination with the fact
that some individuals in the sample die during the time period
this implies that our analysis is conducted on an unbalanced panel
of individuals.
2.1. Econometric approach
To identify the possible impacts of the Stockholm congestion
taxes on purchases of ethanol cars, we employ the Difference-in-
differences approach, DiD (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). The DiD
approach enables us to compare the change in the probability to
purchase an ethanol car in Stockholm (treatment group) before
and after the introduction of the tax, with the corresponding
change in Gothenburg and Malmö (control group). Hence, since
we control for the potential “Stockholm” effect, this approach
makes it possible to control for both observed and unobserved
differences between the control and treatment group (Wooldridge,
2002). The empirical speciﬁcation employed thereby increases the
likelihood of capturing causal effects of the introduction of the
congestion tax.
Our outcome variable is related to the choice to purchase an
ethanol car, and thus dichotomous. This implies a limited depen-
dent variable approach. To deal with unobserved individual
heterogeneity, we employ a panel data probit approach (xtprobit)
to estimate the model. The econometric model is speciﬁed in
Eq. (1) below.
ynit ¼ αþδτtþϑGiþϕτtGiþθCityiþμτtGiCityiþXit' ϖþψΔgdptþvit
ð1Þ
yit ¼ 1½ynit40
vit ¼ ciþuit
In Eq. (1), yit is a limited dependent variable taking the value
one if individual i purchases an ethanol car at time t, i.e., if the
latent variable ynit40, and zero otherwise. τt is a vector of time
dummies. We use a different set of time dummies in different
model speciﬁcations: In our TIMEPERIOD models, we want to
estimate the total effect of the tax after its introduction, but also
test for any additional effects in the year following the introduc-
tion. In these models we therefore have three time dummies. The
ﬁrst (2006–2008) takes the value one in the time period after the
introduction of tax (2006–2008) and zero otherwise, the second
takes the value one if the year is 2007, and the third takes the
value one in the year 2008. In our INDIVIDUAL YEARS models, we
analyze individual year effects. In these models, the time dummies
thus consist of a full set of individual year dummies (2005,
20,062,007 and 2008). Gi is a dummy variable taking the value
one if the individual belongs to the treatment group, in terms of
residing in the Stockholm area, and zero otherwise. The coefﬁ-
cients on the interaction variables τtGi thus capture the effect of
the congestion tax on the probability to purchase an ethanol car.
Finally, we evaluate to what extent individuals living within the
central city of Stockholm were differently affected by the tax than
individuals living in the suburbs. We therefore include a “double”
dummy interaction variable τtGiCityi. This variable takes the
value one in the time period after the introduction of the tax, if
the individual lives in the city center in Stockholm, and zero
otherwise.
The vector Xi consists of socio-economic and socio-demographic
characteristics. Since we want to evaluate the change in consumption
of ethanol cars between the time period before and after the
introduction of the tax, we cannot include individual year dummies
for the years before the tax in our TIMEPERIOD models. However, to
capture the trend, we use the real growth in GDP per capita, Δgdp,
between year t1 and year t evaluated in year t. This variable thus
captures time effects in the model. Finally, vit ¼ ciþuit denotes the
composite error term capturing the time invariant unobserved
individual heterogeneity and the remainder disturbance that can
vary over time as well as across individuals.
Now, in general, the estimated coefﬁcients in non-linear
models cannot be interpreted as easily as in linear models. This
is especially true for interacted variables. However, Puhani (2012)
shows that the estimated coefﬁcient on the DiD variable ðτtGiÞ is
consistent and can be interpreted as the treatment effect on the
treated. In addition, it is now possible to estimate marginal effects
and unbiased coefﬁcients of interaction variables in Stata (version
11 or later) by specifying the variables to be interacted and using
the margins command. We employ this method for our double
interaction variables τtGiCityi. In order to calculate the standard
errors of the marginal effects for all variables, we employ the delta
method.
We would like to alert the reader on our strategy to estimate
the marginal effects. Although it, in practice, is possible to estimate
the marginal effects with a panel model command, the statistical
software will assume that the individual effects are zero, thus
removing the value of the panel approach. In order to get some
idea of the marginal effects, we therefore estimate a pooled probit
(with standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual
level), and calculate the marginal effects resulting from this
estimation. As a robustness check of this approach, we show that
the estimated coefﬁcients of the panel and pooled approach are
very similar.
It should be noted that, in the above econometric speciﬁcation,
the group of individuals who purchased an ethanol car is com-
pared to “everyone else” in the sample. In other words, the
comparison group includes individuals that purchased another
type of car, and individuals who did not purchase any type of car
(regardless of whether they owned one previously or not). How-
ever, it is possible, and perhaps even plausible, that there are
important differences between choices related to the type of car
purchased and choices related to whether to buy a car in the ﬁrst
place. Most importantly, the decision to abstain from a car
purchase may be related to environmental and/or congestion
concerns and may thus constitute a response to the congestion
tax. Hence, in order to not confound the effect of the tax with
other effects, we also estimate Eq. (1) conditional on that the
individual purchased a car.
As mentioned above, we employ a panel data probit approach
to estimate Eq. (1). Panel data probit estimations are only available
with random effects. However, a random effects approach is only
valid if the independent variables are not correlated with the
individual effects. If such a correlation exists, the estimated
coefﬁcients are biased. To deal with this problem, we use the
Chamberlain's random effects probit model (Chamberlain, 1982,
1984; Mundlak, 1978), also known as the pseudo-ﬁxed effects
model. This approach implies that we explicitly model the rela-
tionship between the time-varying regressors and the unobserva-
ble effect in an auxiliary regression (Mundlak, 1978). The model is
estimated under the assumption that:
cijXit Normal ψþXiξ; σ2a
  ð2Þ
where Xi is the average of the time varying explanatory variables
Xit ; t ¼ 1;…:; T and σ2a is the variance of the parameter σ2a in the
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equation ci ¼ψþX
0
itξþai . In other words, σ2a is the conditional
variance of the unobserved individual heterogeneity assumed to
be independent of Xit (Wooldridge, 2002). In practice, the
approach implies that, for each time varying variable and for each
individual, we calculate the average over the full time period. The
resulting variable is then added as an additional covariate in
Eq. (1).
Finally, since probit models are sensitive to miss-speciﬁcation,
and since we have a large share of zeroes in our sample due to the
relatively low presence of ethanol cars in the population, we also
estimate a linear probability model and a complementary log
log model.
As mentioned above, the DiD approach enables us to control for
both observable and unobservable time-invariant differences
between the treated and the non-treated groups. However, the
approach relies on the, inherently untestable, assumption that the
trend in the outcome variable, would have been parallel in the
absence of treatment. If data is available for multiple time-periods
before the introduction of treatment, one may validate this
assumption by running regressions with “fake treatments”, or
placebo effects, in the years preceding the true treatment. If the
coefﬁcients on these placebo effects are insigniﬁcant, the belief in
the validity of the parallel trend assumption is strengthened.
However, if the coefﬁcients on the placebo effects are signiﬁcant,
this increases the risk that the two groups develop differently with
respect to the outcome variable over time. In this case, we cannot
draw conclusions to what extent our estimation captures the true
effect of the treatment (in our case the congestion tax).
In order to reduce the risk of a violated assumption of a
common or parallel trend, in our treatment group, Stockholm,
and our control groups, Malmö and Gothenburg, we match
individuals on socio-economic characteristics by the use of pro-
pensity score matching.
The main purpose of the propensity score estimation is to
balance the observed distribution of covariates across households
in the control and treatment groups.5 When exposure of the
treatment is independent of outcomes, given the observables,
then the relevant summary statistic to be balanced between the
two groups is the conditional probability of being treated, called
the “propensity score” (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 1985). The
ﬁrst step of computing a propensity score in propensity score
matching is to estimate a standard probit or logit participation
model with control variables.6
Hit ¼ αþKitþvit ð3Þ
where, for individual i and year t, Hit is a dummy variable
representing exposure to treatment or not, Kit is a vector of
variables used as determinants of the likelihood of treatment;
and vit is the error term. The predicted values are used to estimate
the propensity score for each observation in the participant and
the nonparticipant samples (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The
comparison group is then formed by picking the “nearest neigh-
bor” with similar characteristics for each participant. The propen-
sity score is given by:
e xð Þ ¼ Pr w¼ 1jX ¼ xð Þ ¼ E wjX ¼ xð Þ ð4Þ
where w is the indicator of exposure to treatment, and x is the
multidimensional vector of pre-treatment characteristics. The
choice of covariates to be included in the propensity score
estimation is based on the principle of maintaining a balance in
using common variables whilst at the same time meeting the
common support criteria.
For each variable and propensity score, the standardized
matching is computed before and after matching as:
SB Xð Þ ¼ 100 XtXNTﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
V t Xð ÞVNT Xð Þ= 2ð Þ
q ð5Þ
where Xt and XNT are the sample means for the treatment and
control groups, and
V t Xð Þ and VNT Xð Þ are the corresponding variance (Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2008).
Additional covariate balancing indicators that can be used in
addition to the SB measure in this case are the likelihood ratio test
of the joint signiﬁcance of all covariates and the pseudo-R2 from a
logit of treatment status on covariates before matching and after
matching on matched sample (ibid). After matching, there should
be no systematic differences in the distribution of covariates
between both groups. As a result, the pseudo-R2 should be fairly
low and the joint signiﬁcance of all covariates should be rejected.
We derive the propensity scores and the matched sample by the
use of the command psmatch2 in Stata (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).
The matched sample is then used for the Difference-in-differences
analysis.
2.2. Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 below. As can
be seen from the table, the matching procedure has given rise to a
relatively high similarity between our sample in Stockholm and
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Stockholm Gothenburg Malmö Total
Gender
% Male 45.85 45.57 45.64 45.67
% Female 54.15 54.43 54.36 54.33
Civil status
% Unmarried 15.54 15.18 13.02 15.29
% Married 74.19 75.97 77.99 75.1
% Divorced 9.53 8.17 8.32 8.92
% Widow/Widower 0.74 0.68 0.66 0.69
Education
% pre-highschool educ 16.19 17.62 17.25 16.63
% High school educ 41.96 42 40.61 41.58
% College, less than 3 years 6.42 6.37 5.75 6.3
% Bachelor degree 33.65 31.91 33.51 33.43
% Post graduate 1.77 2.09 2.87 2.07
Unemployment 6.77 6.26 7.52 7.18
Student 3.25 3.03 3.66 3.48
Early retirement 7.95 8.78 7.38 8.03
Pensioner 18.87 17.93 18.26 18.00
Age
Mean 47.95 48.4 48.77 47.89
Std. dev 12.3 12.33 12.55 12.45
Min 18 18 18 18
Max 76 76 76 76
N children in household
Mean 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99
Std. dev 1.05 1.06 1.09 1.06
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 11 9 12 12
Income
Mean 286826.1 276013.2 258818.6 276100.3
Std. dev 252344.9 205253.2 221367.4 232306.6
Min 0 0 0 0
Max 2,24Eþ07 1,40Eþ07 2,74Eþ07 2,74Eþ07
N 463 749 246 812 170 341 945 742
5 The propensity score matching method is semi-parametric approach, which
does not require an exclusion restriction or a particular speciﬁcation of the
selection equation to construct the counterfactual.
6 Since the objective of the propensity score matching method is to identify a
set of observations that are matched based on observables, our presentation of the
method will remain brief.
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the samples from Gothenburg and Malmö. Women constitute
roughly 54 percent of the sample in all three cities. The majority
of the sample is married (between 74 and 78 percent). About 15
percent are unmarried and 9 percent divorced. The total sample
consists of individuals between the ages of 18 and 76. The mean
age is 48 in Stockholm and Gothenburg and 49 in Malmö.
Individuals in our sample on average have one child under the
age of 18 living in the household.
About 42 percent of the sample has some form of university
education. The distribution of educational attainment is very
similar between the three cities. Similarly, there are no striking
differences in terms of income; mean income ranges from 258,819
SEK in Malmö to 286,826 in Stockholm.
The unemployment rate ranges from 6.3 percent in Gothenburg
to 7.5 in Malmö. Malmö also has a slightly higher share of
students, 3.7 percent, than Stockholm and Gothenburg (3.3 and
3 percent, respectively). Finally, the Gothenburg sample contains
about 1 percentage point more early retirees and about 1 percen-
tage point fewer pensioners than the samples in Stockholm and
Malmö. Table 2 depicts the number of purchased ethanol cars in
our sample, divided between Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö.
As can be seen in the table, the number of ethanol cars is very
small in the beginning of the time period, but rises sharply over
the years.
3. Results
The main results of the empirical analysis are presented in
Tables 3–5 below. In order to facilitate reading, we only present
estimated coefﬁcients and marginal effects of the main variables of
interest (the full set of results can be found in Table A1 in the
Appendix A). Differences in the results due to estimation techni-
que are discussed in Section 3 below.
We start by describing the results of the tax variables. Table 3
presents estimated coefﬁcients while Table 4 presents marginal
effects (estimated with a pooled probit approach).
As described in Section 3.1 above, we have estimated four
models relating to the probability to purchase an ethanol car. The
ﬁrst panels in Table 3 contain results for the panel probit estima-
tion on the full sample (unconditional), i.e. regardless of whether
an individual bought a new car or not, while the results in the
second panels (conditional) relate to the probability of purchasing
an ethanol car, given that the individual purchased any car in that
year. Hence, the results in the second panels are conditional on
purchasing a car. We further test to what extent the effect of the
tax differs between different years. Consequently, the upper panel
of Table 3 presents results for the overall effect of the tax (i.e., the
entire time period since its introduction) and tests to what extent
there were additional effects during the years following the
introduction, while the lower panel presents results for each
individual year.
Our results suggest that the congestion tax had a signiﬁcant
impact on ethanol car purchases in both 2006 and 2007 (lower
panel of Table 3). There do not seem to be any signiﬁcant lag
effects as none of the coefﬁcients on the year-speciﬁc effects are
positive in the upper panel in Table 3.
However, our results also suggest that, although the tax had an
overall positive effect on the probability of purchasing an ethanol
car, the insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on the year-speciﬁc effect in 2008
may be interpreted as the tax effect fading away over time. In
Table 4, we present the marginal increase in the probability of
purchasing an ethanol car due to the tax in the time period 2006–
2008, for the conditional sample.7
As can be seen in the table, in the absence of the congestion tax
the average probability of purchasing an ethanol car (given that
any car is purchased) would have been about 3.3 percent in the
time period 2006–2008. The introduction of the tax increased this
probability by 1.2 percentage points (i.e., to 4.5 percent) over the
entire period. The right column in Table 4 depicts the marginal
effects for the individual years. As can be seen, the tax increased
the probability of purchasing an ethanol car by 1.3 percentage
points in 2006 and 2007, but only by 0.8 percentage points in
2008. This reduction corresponds to the negative (but insignif-
icant) marginal effect in the left column for 2008.
The marginal effects of the main socio-economic variables
(individual year speciﬁcation) are presented in Table 5 below.
The full set of results is presented in the Appendix A.
As can be seen in Table 5, the marginal effects of the covariates
are very small for the unconditional sample. This is not surprising,
as we are not distinguishing between the choice to purchase a car
and the decision to purchase an ethanol car. In this analysis we
compare ethanol car purchasers to all other individuals, both those
who purchased a non-ethanol car, and those who did not buy any
car. Hence, we include all individuals who would not have bought
a car regardless of policy. This, in turn, implies that the size of the
marginal effects is expected to be small. If we focus our attention
on the decision between a regular car and an ethanol car, we see
that the single most important predictor for an ethanol car
purchase is a past experience of ethanol car ownership: having
owned an ethanol car in the previous period increases the
probability of purchasing a new ethanol car by 8.6 percentage
points.
The second most inﬂuential variable is education: having a
post-graduate university degree increases the probability of pur-
chasing an ethanol car by 2.5 percentage points in comparison to
an individual who only attended elementary school. The effect
may seem small, but considering that the probability of purchasing
an ethanol car during 2004 to 2008 was only 2.7 percent, it implies
that an individual with a post-graduate degree is almost twice as
likely to purchase an ethanol car. It is interesting to note that even
individuals with only high school education, a group with a
relatively weak position on the labor market, are signiﬁcantly
more likely to purchase ethanol cars than individuals without high
school education. Although we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant relation-
ship between income and ethanol car purchases, this result may
Table 2
Analyzed ethanol and other car purchases 2004–2008.
Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Stockholm
Ethanol 64 102 219 453 626 1464
Other 11177 11392 10420 9706 8001 50696
Gothenburg
Ethanol 74 59 123 260 348 864
Other 6880 6729 6274 5853 4546 30282
Malmö
Ethanol 14 25 38 85 186 348
Other 4567 4654 4526 4526 3452 21342
Total sample
Ethanol 163 199 403 845 1236 2846
Other 24745 25103 23493 21885 17844 113070
Total 24908 25302 23896 22730 19080 115916
7 The average marginal effects for the entire time period 2004–2008 are
smaller, as are the marginal effects for the unconditional sample. Results are
available from the authors upon request.
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indicate that individuals with a particularly low income are
signiﬁcantly different from individuals in other income segments,
since the lack of upper secondary education is highly correlated
with low income in Sweden. In accordance with this interpreta-
tion, we also ﬁnd that individuals who do not work (unemployed,
prematurely pensioners and students) are signiﬁcantly less likely
to purchase ethanol cars. However, it should be noted that these
effects are relatively small: having an upper secondary education
increases the probability of purchasing an ethanol car by 0.4 per-
centage points, while unemployment and early retirement reduce
it by 0.5 and 1 percentage points respectively.
In contrast to previous studies, we do not ﬁnd that women are
consistently more prone to purchase ethanol cars. The negative
and signiﬁcant effect of gender in the unconditional sample is
explained by a lower probability of women purchasing cars, but
even when selection bias is controlled for, no signiﬁcant pattern
can be found (see Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix A for the
selection analysis). In 2004 and 2008 women are signiﬁcantly
more likely to purchase ethanol cars then are men, while in 2005–
2007 there is no signiﬁcant difference between the genders
Returning to our main estimation, we ﬁnd that living in the city
center is associated with about 1 percentage point increase in the
probability of purchasing an ethanol car in Stockholm and Gothen-
burg, but with a reduction in the probability in Malmö. It is beyond
the scope of this study to further analyze the cause of the
Table 3
Main estimation results (xtprobit).
Unconditional Conditional
Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z| Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z|
TIME PERIOD
Tax 2006–2008 0.109 0.054 0.043 0.154 0.065 0.017
Sthlm_city#Tax2006–2008 0.020 0.068 0.765 0.059 0.085 0.487
Tax 2007 0.014 0.048 0.769 0.024 0.06 0.681
Sthlm_city#tax2007 0.030 0.058 0.603 0.09 0.077 0.242
Tax 2008 -0.043 0.045 0.344 0.069 0.058 0.228
Sthlm_city#tax2008 0,018 0.056 0.746 0.019 0.075 0.798
INIDIVIDUAL YEARS
Tax 2006 0.109 0.054 0.043 0.164 0.071 0.021
Sthlm_city#Tax2006–2008 0.020 0.068 0.765 0.066 0.092 0.477
Tax 2007 0.095 0.047 0.046 0.139 0.063 0.028
Sthlm_city#tax2007 0.051 0.060 0.402 0.160 0.083 0.054
Tax 2008 0.066 0.045 0.143 0.091 0.061 0.133
Sthlm_city#tax2008 0.002 0.058 0.972 0.085 0.081 0.294
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year ﬁxed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Chamberlain–Mundlak effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 945730 115915
Wald chi2 3313.89 2052.13
Table 4
Marginal effects on the conditional probability of purchasing an ethanol car in
2006–2008.
TIME PERIOD INDIVIDUAL YEARS
Margin Std.Erra P4z Margin Std.Erra P4z
Predict (ethanol car)
No tax 2006–2008 0.033 0.001 0.000 0.033 0.001 0.000
dy/dx Std.Err P4z dy/dx Std.Err P4z
Tax 06–08 0.012 0.004 0.007
Tax 06 0.013 0.005 0.011
Tax 07 0.001 0.004 0.895 0.013 0.005 0.005
Tax 08 0.005 0.004 0.197 0.008 0.004 0.063
a Delta-method.
Table 5
Marginal effects of main socio-economic variables–Indivdiual years.
UNCONDITIONAL CONDITIONAL
dy/dx Std.Ea P4z dy/dx Std. Ea P4z
Year 2005b 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.023
Year 2006 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.000
Year 2007 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.004 0.000
Year 2008 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.071 0.012 0.000
Stockholm 0.000 0.001 0.765 0.005 0.007 0.428
Stockholm city 0.000 0.000 0.759 0.009 0.002 0.000
Malmö city 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.000
Göteborg city 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.009 0.001 0.000
Work in city center 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.000
Owned ethanol car t-1 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.004 0.000
Female 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.900
Age 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.004 0.002 0.037
Civil statusc
Married 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000
Divorced 0.000 0.000 0.582 0.004 0.002 0.023
Widowed 0.000 0.001 0.640 0.002 0.005 0.674
N children (0–18) in hh 0.000 0.000 0.486 0.002 0.001 0.077
Income (logged) 0.000 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.001 0.941
Educationd
Upper secondary education 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001
College, less than 3 years 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.002 0.000
Bachelor degree 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.001 0.000
Post graduate degree 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.004 0.000
Unemployed 0.001 0.000 0.027 0.005 0.002 0.037
Student 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.046
Premature pensioner 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.000
Pensioner 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.002 0.002 0.366
Country of birthe
Scandinavia except Sweden 0.001 0.000 0.037 0.004 0.003 0.145
Europe except Scandinavia 0.001 0.000 0.129 0.001 0.003 0.683
North America 0.001 0.001 0.340 0.001 0.008 0.930
Other country of origin 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000
Partner owns car -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.000
Mother's income. log 0.000 0.000 0.931 0.000 0.000 0.580
Father's income. log 0.000 0.000 0.332 0.000 0.000 0.793
a Standard errors estimated by delta method.
b 2004 is reference.
c Unmarried is reference.
d Lower secondary is reference.
e Sweden is the reference group.
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deviating behavior in Malmö city center. However, if individuals
living in Malmö are inherently different from individuals living in
Gothenburg and Stockholm, their presence may bias the result. In
an alternative estimation, we therefore excluded individuals from
Malmö from our estimation. The results are presented in Table 6
below. As can be seen in the table, the qualitative results remain
almost the same in this analysis. The main difference from the
previous analysis is that, without Malmö, the tax had a signiﬁcant
effect in 2007 and 2008, and individuals living in the Stockholm
city center were signiﬁcantly more affected by the tax than
individuals living outside the city limit.
3.1. Sensitivity analysis
We use several techniques to test the robustness of our results.
First, since ethanol car purchase is a relatively rare event, we
estimate a Complementary log log model (cloglog). This estima-
tion procedure allows a skewed distribution. Second, since probit
models are highly sensitive for miss-speciﬁcation, we estimate a
random effects linear probability model (xtreg). The results for the
main variables of interest are presented in Table 7, below. All
models are corrected for potential correlation between exogenous
variables and individual effects in terms of Chamberlain-Mundlak
effects.
The coefﬁcients resulting from the estimation of the Comple-
mentary log log model and the linear probability model cannot be
directly compared to the probit estimates, but as can be seen in
Table 7, the sign and signiﬁcance level of the complementary log
log estimation is similar to that of the panel probit (with the
exception that the coefﬁcient on the tax in 2008 is positive and
Table 7
Model results: Probit, xtprobit, cloglog, xtprobit.
UNCONDITIONAL CONDITIONAL
probit xtprobit cloglog xtreg probit xtprobit cloglog xtreg
TIME PERIOD
Tax 2006–2008n 0.108nn 0.109nn 0.344nn 0.000 0.154nn 0.164nn 0.372nn 0.004
Sthlm_city#Tax2006–2008 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.000 0.059 0.066 0.036 0.008nn
Tax 2007 0.014 0.014 0.052 0.000 0.024 0.025 0.052 0.002
Sthlm_city#tax2007 0.030 0.030 0.061 0.001n 0.090 0.094 0.112 0.019nnn
Tax 2008 0.042 0.043 0.122 0.000 0.069 0.073 0.152 0.001
Sthlm_city#tax2008 0.018 0.018 0.058 0.001 0.019 0.019 0.047 0.024nnn
INDIVIDUAL YEARS
Tax 2006n 0.108nn 0.109nn 0.344n 0.000 0.154nn 0.164nn 0.372nn 0.004
Sthlm_city#Tax2006–2008 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.000 0.059 0.066 0.036 0.008nn
Tax 2007 0.094nn 0.095nn 0.292nn 0.001 0.130nn 0.139nn 0.320nn 0.006nn
Sthlm_city#tax2007 0.050 0.051 0.079 0.001nnn 0.150nn 0.160n 0.148 0.027nnn
Tax 2008 0.065 0.066 0.222 0.000 0.085 0.091 0.22n 0.005n
Sthlm_city#tax2008 0.002 0.002 0.041 0.001n 0.079 0.085 0.011 0.033nnn
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year ﬁxed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Chamberlain–Mundlak effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 945730 945730 945730 945730 115915 115915 115915 115915
Wald Chi-2 3906.69 3313.89 5047.11 5433.2 3322.82 2052.13 4070.98 4469.93
n Signiﬁcant at 10%.
nn Signiﬁcant at 5%.
nnn Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Fig. 2. Trend in privately purchased cars per month 2005 (full population ASTRID
database, own computations).
Table 6
Main estimation results excluding Malmö (xtprobit).
Unconditional Conditional
Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z| Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z|
TIME PERIOD
Tax 2006–2008 0.113 0.057 0.045 0.161 0.074 0.030
Sthlm_city#Tax2006–2008 0.020 0.068 0.767 0,064 0.091 0.480
Tax 2007 0.013 0.050 0.803 0.026 0.068 0.704
Sthlm_city#tax2007 0.030 0.058 0.604 0.094 0.082 0.251
Tax 2008 0.005 0.048 0.920 0.016 0.066 0.811
Sthlm_city#tax2008 0.018 0.056 0.746 0.020 0.080 0.803
INIDIVIDUAL YEARS
Tax 2006 0,113 0.057 0.045 0.161 0.074 0.030
Sthlm_city#Tax2006–2008 0.020 0.068 0.767 0.064 0.091 0.480
Tax 2007 0.101 0.050 0.044 0.135 0.066 0.040
Sthlm_city#tax2007 0.050 0.060 0.404 0.158 0.082 0.053
Tax 2008 0.118 0.048 0.013 0.145 0.064 0,022
Sthlm_city#tax2008 0.002 0.058 0.974 0.084 0.080 0.293
Control variables YES YES
Year ﬁxed effects YES YES
Chamberlain–Mundlak effects YES YES
N 775394 94225
Wald chi2 2893.69 1896.17
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signiﬁcant in the individual year regression).8 However, the results
of the linear probability model give different results. Most impor-
tantly, the linear probability model estimation suggests that there
was no overall effect of the tax if we consider the entire Stockholm
region, but that the introduction of the tax affected individuals
living in the city center to a signiﬁcant extent, and that this effect
persisted during the years following the introduction of the tax. If
we look at the results for the individual years, we can further see
that the linear probability model suggests that the lack of overall
effect is caused by an absence of effect in 2006. This may be
explained by the fact that Stockholmers seem to have prepared for
the tax by purchasing ethanol cars before its introduction (see
Fig. 2 below). We may thus expect a relatively low level of ethanol
car consumption directly after its introduction. However, it should
be noted that although the linear probability model is less
sensitive to miss speciﬁcations, it is associated with other pro-
blems. One of these is that the model is not restricted to the 0 to
1 interval. Indeed, when we estimate the predicted values of the
different models, we see that the linear probability model predicts
negative probabilities (See Fig. A1 in the Appendix A).
As described in Section 3.1 the Difference-in-differences
approach is able to account for observed and unobserved differ-
ences between the “treatment” and “control” groups. However, the
approach rests heavily on the assumption of a common trend. In
order to get an idea of the validity of the common trend
assumption, we therefore ran a set of regressions with fake
treatments (placebo effects) in the years preceding the introduc-
tion of the congestion tax. The results are presented in Table 8
below. As can be seen in the table, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant placebo
effects for individuals living in Stockholm city center. However, the
results do not consistently suggest that individuals in Stockholm
City were on a different trend than individuals in Gothenburg and
Malmö in terms of more rapidly becoming more prone to purchase
ethanol cars. Indeed, the coefﬁcient on the placebo effect in 2004
is negative.
The positive and signiﬁcant effect of the placebo treatment in
2005 is at ﬁrst glance disturbing. It might suggest that Stock-
holmers had developed preferences for more environmentally
friendly cars even before the introduction of the tax, and thus
that we are capturing an effect that does not pertain to the tax
itself, but rather to a change of preferences unrelated to the tax.
However, a look at the data shows that this effect is very likely to
stem from an anticipation of the introduction of the tax and can
therefore be called an anticipation effect. As can be seen in Fig. 3
below there was no clear difference in trend between Stockholm
on the one hand and Gothenburg and Malmö on the other, before
July 2005. However, after July 2005 sales of ethanol cars increased
dramatically in the Stockholm area. It is thus highly likely that
individuals in Stockholm, in anticipation of the tax, chose to buy
ethanol cars before its introduction 6 months later.
Although Fig. 3 seems to present a relatively clear picture, one
could conclude that the shift in the trend in Stockholm in July
2005 may be a seasonal effect. However, a closer look at the data
reveals that the shift is relatively permanent, and arises ﬁrst in
2005 (see Fig. 3).
Table 8
Trend analysis xtprobit.
UNCONDITIONAL CONDITIONAL
Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z| Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z|
Placebo03 0.065 0.092 0.483 0.093 0.112 0.407
sthlm_city#placebo03 0.379 0.172 0.028 0.505 0.217 0.020
Placebo04 0.071 0.070 0.309 0.083 0.088 0.346
sthlm_city#placebo04 0.197 0.100 0.050 0.241 0.130 0.065
Placebo05 0.033 0.069 0.629 0.027 0.085 0.753
sthlm_city#placebo04 0.325 0.096 0.001 0.420 0.127 0.001
Control variables YES YES
Chamberlain–Mundlak effects YES YES
N 745743 73882
Table 9
Main estimation results excluding Stockholm city center (xtprobit).
Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z| Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z|
TIME PERIOD
Tax 2006–2008 0.109 0.053 0.040 0.166 0.071 0.019
Tax 2007 0.014 0.047 0.767 0.025 0.065 0.699
Tax 2008 0.042 0.045 0.347 0.073 0.062 0.241
INIDIVIDUAL YEARS
Tax 2006 0.109 0.053 0.040 0.166 0.071 0.019
Tax 2007 0.095 0.047 0.043 0.141 0.063 0.025
Tax 2008 0.067 0.045 0.133 0.093 0.060 0.124
Control variables YES YES
Year ﬁxed effects YES YES
Chamberlain–Mundlak effects YES YES
N 784514 101458
Wald chi2 2781.39 1723.2
8 Based on the Akaike and Baysian Information Criteria, we do not ﬁnd
evidence that the Complementary log log model ﬁts the data better than the
probit model (results available upon request).
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Free residential parking for green car owners was introduced in
Stockholm city center during 2005. Consequently, a potential
concern may be that the observed “anticipation effect” in reality
is caused by the incentive to park freely rather than to avoid the
congestion tax. Fortunately, since free parking only applied to
individuals living in the city center, we can control for this effect.
Reassuringly, re-running our estimations on a sample where
individuals living in the city center are excluded does not change
the results much (See Table 9, below). However, one interesting
effect of excluding individuals living within the city limit is that
our estimation results now show a signiﬁcantly positive effect of
the tax in 2008.
4. Discussion
The purpose of this paper has been to contribute to the under-
standing of how policy and population characteristics inﬂuence the
composition of the car ﬂeet. More speciﬁcally, we analyzed if and to
what extent the Stockholm congestion tax affected private purchases
of ethanol/E85 cars in Stockholm, and estimated to what extent socio-
economic and demographic factors hold predictive power for the
decision to purchase these types of cars.
Our analysis contributes to the existing literature in at least
three ways. First, in contrast to previous research, which mainly
relates to correlations between the congestion tax and car-related
behavior, we approached the tax in Stockholm as a natural
experiment and used the two other metropolitan cities in Swe-
den–Gothenburg and Malmö–to create a counterfactual course of
events. Second, having access to unique register data enabled us to
estimate the relationship between socio-economic and socio-
demographic factors and ethanol car purchases. Thirdly, since
corporate purchase of cars dominates the market, the coefﬁcients
emanating from studies of aggregated datasets are likely to be
dominated by corporate behavior. Thus, since our dataset contains
information on a representative sample of individuals, our analysis
provides new information on the factors that determine the
purchases of AFVs by households.
Our ﬁndings concerning the effects of the tax are consistent
with the suggestive evidence in previous studies (Börjesson et al.,
2012): the Stockholm congestion tax in our natural experiment
had a signiﬁcant impact on ethanol car purchases in both 2006
and 2007. In addition, our analysis points to a potential
anticipation effect of the tax shortly before the introduction.
Finally, although the reduction is insigniﬁcant, we see signs that
the effect of the tax may have faded away over time.
Even though our results suggest a positive and signiﬁcant
initial effect of the congestion tax on the probability of purchasing
an ethanol car, it should also be noted that the marginal effect of
the tax is smaller than for example the effect of other covariates.
The most important predictor is unsurprisingly previous owner-
ship of an ethanol car, which increases the probability of a new
purchase by 8.6 percentage points. However, we also ﬁnd a
relatively strong relationship between education and ethanol car
purchase: seen over the entire study period (2004–2008), the
Stockholm congestion tax increased the probability to purchase an
ethanol car by 0.2 percent. This should be compared to having a
post graduate education, which increases the probability to
purchase an ethanol car by 2.5 percent. Hence, although the
congestion tax is likely to have had a signiﬁcant impact on car
purchases, our analysis suggest that socio-demographic factors
may be more important for the diffusion of AFVs.
Our result for education is consistent with previous research,
which has found that higher education have a signiﬁcant positive
effect on the stated choice of hybrid vehicles (Potoglou and
Kanaroglou, 2007) and AFVs (Jansson et al., 2011). However, while
Dagsvik and Liu (2009) found that high-income households value
AFVs higher than conventional cars, our results do not suggest that
income has any signiﬁcant effect on the probability of purchasing an
ethanol car. This may be a consequence of a correlation between
education and income, where the former determines the latter.
In contrast to previous research, our results do not lend support
to the hypothesis that women buy environmental cars to a higher
extent than men (Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 2006). Our
results thus suggest that although females might view AFVs as
more environmentally friendly than males (e.g., Jansson et al.,
2009), their perceptions do not seem to carry over into actual
behavior. This might also be an effect of the fact that males
purchase and own the majority of cars and that although a car
may be registered to a woman, the male in the household might
have had an impact on the ﬁnal choice of vehicle. However, our
results indicate that in the years of 2004 and 2008 only, females
did purchase a higher proportion of ethanol cars than males. The
conclusion is that relationships between gender and purchases of
ethanol cars are ambiguous and hard to predict.
Finally, by focusing solely on private car purchases our investigation
also shows that not only corporate, but also private car purchases were
positively affected by the congestion tax (see Börjesson et al., 2012 and
Eliasson and Jonsson, 2011). This indicates that policies and incentives
targeted at both corporate car purchases and private purchases are
important for a transition of the car ﬂeet into a less fossil-based one.
Since we also ﬁnd that previous ownership of an ethanol car is an
important predictor of future ethanol car purchases, it can be argued
that experience from driving a private car might spill over into the
corporate domain and vice versa. However, more research on the
relationships between the private and corporate car market is
necessary in order to elucidate whether there is a causal relationship.
Consumers who have purchased an AFV are more likely to re-
purchase (i.e., conﬁrming their decision), which has also been found
in previous studies using survey data (Jansson et al., 2010). Our results
conﬁrm these ﬁndings using a wider sample and actual behavioral
register data. The ﬁnding can be explained by pointing to the desire of
individuals to re-conﬁrm previously made adoption decisions in order
to avoid cognitive dissonance, so it might not be a measure of
satisfaction per se, although it is highly likely.
A limitationwith our study is that it only concerns ethanol cars and
not other types of AFVs such as electric vehicles or gas cars. This
limitation is due to the incentives offered during the time period
studied and also what types of cars that were adopted by consumers.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Ja
n
M
ar
s
M
ay
Ju
ly
Se
pt
N
ov Ja
n
M
ar
s
M
ay
Ju
ly
Se
pt
N
ov Ja
n
M
ar
s
M
ay
Ju
ly
Se
pt
N
ov
2004 2005 2006
Stockholm Gothenburg Malmö
Fig. 3. Trend in purchased cars per month 2004–2006 (full population ASTRID
database, own computations).
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5. Conclusions and policy implications
Previous research has found that the Stockholm congestion tax
was efﬁcient in decreasing congestion over the short and long
term (Börjesson et al., 2012, Eliasson et al., 2009). Our analysis
shows that a policy with the main goal of reducing trafﬁc
congestion from cars also has an effect on the composition of
the car ﬂeet if AFVs are excluded from the congestion fee. This
ﬁnding carries implications beyond the Swedish context. Cur-
rently, many cities have congestion charges, or consider imple-
mentation of such fees. Our analysis suggests that if these policy
instruments are linked to less environmentally harmful vehicles,
in terms of an exemption from the charge, this may prove doubly
advantageous-less congestion and a less fossil fuel dependent car
ﬂeet. In this light, it is notable that Sweden has decided not to
exempt electrical vehicles from the congestion charges in Stock-
holm and Gothenburg. In Norway these types of AFVs are
exempted from road tolls, which is considered to be one reason
why the electrical car market has lately taken off substantially
(e.g., Klöckner et al., 2013).
However, our analysis also shows that the marginal effect of the
congestion charge although signiﬁcant, will not revolutionize the
composition of the car ﬂeet. In addition, we ﬁnd that the effect
may be temporary and that other factors, such as socio-economic
variables, may prove equally or more important for changing the
composition of the car ﬂeet.
As described in the result section, we ﬁnd that the exemption
of the congestion charge is associated with an increase in the
conditional probability to purchase an ethanol car corresponding
to 1.2 percentage points. This is a relatively large increase
considering that the conditional probability without the charge
is only 3.3 percent. However, it also implies that even with the
congestion fee in place, the probability to buy an ethanol car
instead for a regular car is still just 4.5 percent. Hence, in order to
substantially alter the composition of the car ﬂeet, other measures
are needed. Our ﬁnding that the effect of the tax falls over time
suggests that although ﬁnancial incentives similar to those in
Stockholm may have an important effect in the short term, there
may be a need to raise the tax over time to maintain the effect.
Concerning the effects of socio-economic determinants of
ethanol car purchases, our results point to the importance of
previous experience of ethanol cars, time effects and to the role of
education. These results are likely related to preferences, social
norms and awareness of the effect of cars on e.g., global warming.
Our analysis does not go deep enough to generate any conclusive
results on this topic, but it points to the continuant need to
complement ﬁnancial incentives with awareness-raising policies.
Indeed, it is now relatively well known that ﬁnancial incentives
may crowd out intrinsic motivation to engage in pro-
environmental behavior (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). These
are important aspects to consider when implementing environ-
mental policies in the form of ﬁnancial incentives or exemptions
from taxes for less environmentally harmful alternatives.
In addition, congestion charges would probably be more
effective were they not merely stand-alone measures. Other
methods, such as improving public transportation, reviewing
infrastructure for bicycling and walking, and considering the
entire price structure of transports in a region become important
(e.g., Gärling and Schuitema, 2007). In this sense, the effect of a
congestion charge can be enhanced and positive environmental
effects expected to last longer. In accordance, future research
needs to consider infrastructure, cognitive factors and technologi-
cal aspects in an integrated manner to better understand a more
optimally constructed policy for reducing negative environmental
consequences of transportation. The technological aspects bring us
to the last point. During the last few years, cars have become more
fuel-efﬁcient and several types of AFVs have been developed.
These technologies are likely to become more fuel-efﬁcient and
thus it becomes important to continually revise what types of
vehicles will be exempted from congestion charges such as the one
in Stockholm. All cars affect congestion and from this perspective
it can be questioned if any types of cars should be exempted and
for how long. Thus, our results indicate that policies aiming at
reducing fossil fuel dependence, tailpipe emissions and congestion
problems need to be considered in an integrated manner in order
not to have positive effects in one area but simultaneously having
adverse effects in another.
A ﬁnal policy implication is the importance of monitoring the
general public's view on both the congestion tax as such (e.g.,
Eliasson and Jonsson, 2011) and on AFVs. If AFVs are exempted
from a tax but are not perceived as substantially less harmful for
the environment by citizens and drivers, there might be risk of
perceiving the tax as unjust between those who can afford to
purchase an AFV and those who cannot. Since our results point at
difference in adoption of AFVs among high and low income
segments, these effects are important to consider when revising
the policy and the type of vehicle exemption. In sum, since what is
perceived as more or less environmentally harmful changes over
time, a vital part for a successful policy is the constant revising of it
as technology and behaviors change. One important topic for
future research may therefore be to analyze how different socio-
economic groups react to policy interventions of the kind analyzed
in this paper.
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Appendix A
See Fig. A1 and Tables A1–A3.
Fig. A1. Predicted values, probit, complementary log log and linear probability
model.
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Table A1
Estimated coefﬁcients all variables.
Unconditional Conditional
Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z| Coef. Std. Err. P4 |z|
TIME PERIOD
Timeperiod¼2006–2010 0.331 0.086 0.000 0.419 0.127 0.001
Year 2007 0.179 0.058 0.002 0.267 0.078 0.001
Year 2008 0.128 0.290 0.658 0.039 0.402 0.923
INDIVIDUAL YEARS
Year 2005 0.094 0.048 0.051 0.116 0.069 0.091
Year 2006 0.318 0.080 0.000 0.402 0.119 0.001
Year 2007 0.631 0.112 0.000 0.835 0.170 0.000
Year 2008 0.846 0.145 0.000 1.251 0.224 0.000
Stockholm 0.035 0.106 0.742 0.115 0.141 0.417
Stockholm city 0.001 0.049 0.986 0.132 0.066 0.044
Malmö city 0.206 0.034 0.000 0.183 0.047 0.000
Göteborg city 0.046 0.021 0.030 0.186 0.031 0.000
Work in city center 0.045 0.015 0.003 0.082 0.021 0.000
Owned ethanol car t-1 0.752 0.081 0.000 1.522 0.127 0.000
Female 0.186 0.016 0.000 0.004 0.022 0.837
Age 0.046 0.036 0.197 0.078 0.054 0.150
Age\widehat2 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.016
Civil status
Married 0.107 0.021 0.000 0.113 0.030 0.000
Divorced 0.018 0.033 0.576 0.102 0.046 0.026
Widowed 0.042 0.084 0.614 0.049 0.117 0.677
N children (0–18) in hh 0.012 0.018 0.487 0.040 0.024 0.095
Income (logged) 0.015 0.013 0.233 0.001 0.016 0.948
IncomenStockholm 0.013 0.012 0.290 0.015 0.017 0.369
Education
Upper secondary education 0.074 0.024 0.002 0.109 0.034 0.001
College, less than 3 years 0.178 0.033 0.000 0.348 0.048 0.000
Bachelor degree 0.222 0.025 0.000 0.416 0.039 0.000
Post graduate degree 0.189 0.044 0.000 0.514 0.068 0.000
Unemployed 0.077 0.035 0.030 0.098 0.048 0.040
Student 0.165 0.059 0.005 0.162 0.082 0.049
Premature pensioner 0.162 0.036 0.000 0.218 0.050 0.000
Pensioner 0.055 0.026 0.035 0.033 0.037 0.365
Country of birth
Scandinavia except Sweden 0.079 0.042 0.060 0.081 0.059 0.168
Europe except Scandinavia 0.072 0.052 0.170 0.030 0.075 0.693
North America 0.094 0.119 0.427 0.016 0.173 0.928
Other country of origin 0.112 0.027 0.000 0.186 0.039 0.000
Partner owns car 0.345 0.017 0.000 0.199 0.025 0.000
Mother's income. log 0.001 0.007 0.935 0.005 0.009 0.592
Father's income. log 0.006 0.007 0.341 0.002 0.009 0.786
Real growth 0.134 0.069 0.051 0.165 0.098 0.091
average age 0.053 0.036 0.138 0.063 0.054 0.243
average child hh 0.092 0.024 0.000 0.148 0.034 0.000
average income 0.090 0.013 0.000 0.116 0.018 0.000
average mother's inc 0.002 0.007 0.796 0.000 0.010 0.980
average father's inc 0.012 0.007 0.098 0.013 0.010 0.188
Constant 3.541 0.274 0.000 3.041 0.390 0.000
/lnsig2u 3.784 1.411 1.814 0.571
sigma_u 0.151 0.106 0.404 0.115
rho 0.022 0.031 0.140 0.069
N 945730 115915
Wald Chi2 3313.890 2052.530
Table A2
First stage selection estimation: decision to purchase a car.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Coef. Std.
Err
P4z Coef. Std.
Err
P4z Coef. Std.
Err
P4z Coef. Std.
Err
P4z Coef. Std.
Err
P4z
Owned car t-1 0.476 0.009 0.000 0.451 0.009 0.000 0.444 0.009 0.000 0.463 0.009 0.000 0.421 0.010 0.000
Stockholm 0.104 0.034 0.002 0.135 0.034 0.000 0.146 0.036 0.000 0.182 0.038 0.000 0.102 0.040 0.011
Sthlm city center 0.168 0.012 0.000 0.140 0.012 0.000 0.160 0.013 0.000 0.184 0.013 0.000 0.136 0.014 0.000
Malmo city center 0.115 0.015 0.000 0.104 0.015 0.000 0.104 0.015 0.000 0.099 0.016 0.000 0.070 0.016 0.000
Gbg city center 0.112 0.012 0.000 0.125 0.012 0.000 0.117 0.013 0.000 0.091 0.013 0.000 0.129 0.014 0.000
Work city center 0.013 0.009 0.138 0.021 0.009 0.014 0.019 0.009 0.033 0.023 0.009 0.010 0.031 0.010 0.001
Female 0.260 0.008 0.000 0.274 0.008 0.000 0.272 0.009 0.000 0.283 0.009 0.000 0.276 0.009 0.000
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Table A2 (continued )
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Coef. Std.
Err
P4z Coef. Std.
Err
P4z Coef. Std.
Err
P4z Coef. Std.
Err
P4z Coef. Std.
Err
P4z
Age 0.028 0.003 0.000 0.032 0.003 0.000 0.026 0.003 0.000 0.027 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.003 0.000
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Civil status
Married 0.011 0.011 0.314 0.006 0.011 0.571 0.019 0.011 0.089 0.030 0.012 0.010 0.034 0.013 0.006
Divorced 0.080 0.016 0.000 0.054 0.016 0.001 0.087 0.016 0.000 0.099 0.017 0.000 0.104 0.018 0.000
Widowed 0.097 0.045 0.032 0.048 0.046 0.294 0.144 0.046 0.002 0.128 0.047 0.007 0.102 0.049 0.039
N. children (0–18) in
household
0.006 0.004 0.206 0.018 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.226 0.026 0.005 0.000 0.012 0.005 0.015
Income (logged) 0.028 0.003 0.000 0.033 0.003 0.000 0.025 0.003 0.000 0.017 0.003 0.000 0.021 0.004 0.000
Education
High school 0.031 0.011 0.005 0.016 0.011 0.161 0.008 0.011 0.462 0.013 0.012 0.253 0.022 0.012 0.081
College, o3 years 0.136 0.018 0.000 0.059 0.018 0.001 0.089 0.018 0.000 0.098 0.019 0.000 0.135 0.020 0.000
Bachelor degree 0.123 0.012 0.000 0.090 0.012 0.000 0.089 0.012 0.000 0.110 0.013 0.000 0.130 0.013 0.000
Post graduate degree 0.286 0.030 0.000 0.268 0.030 0.000 0.251 0.030 0.000 0.243 0.030 0.000 0.321 0.032 0.000
IncomenLive in Sthlm 0.000 0.004 0.991 0.004 0.004 0.374 0.004 0.005 0.402 0.012 0.005 0.012 0.001 0.005 0.876
Country of birth
Scandinavia except Sweden 0.017 0.021 0.407 0.003 0.021 0.894 0.009 0.021 0.670 0.029 0.022 0.182 0.022 0.023 0.331
Europe except Scandinavia 0.148 0.029 0.000 0.073 0.028 0.009 0.060 0.028 0.036 0.109 0.030 0.000 0.087 0.031 0.006
North America 0.201 0.070 0.004 0.165 0.065 0.011 0.241 0.070 0.001 0.090 0.069 0.189 0.139 0.075 0.064
Other country of origin 0.012 0.013 0.363 0.010 0.013 0.427 0.004 0.013 0.763 0.043 0.013 0.001 0.054 0.014 0.000
Unemployed 0.036 0.013 0.007 0.038 0.013 0.005 0.029 0.015 0.043 0.007 0.017 0.670 0.013 0.020 0.505
Student 0.136 0.022 0.000 0.112 0.022 0.000 0.116 0.023 0.000 0.084 0.025 0.001 0.083 0.029 0.004
Premature pensioner 0.003 0.015 0.850 0.002 0.015 0.899 0.003 0.015 0.839 0.018 0.016 0.243 0.013 0.017 0.419
Pensioner 0.041 0.016 0.009 0.065 0.015 0.000 0.037 0.016 0.018 0.038 0.016 0.016 0.038 0.017 0.020
Partner owns car 0.222 0.009 0.000 0.243 0.009 0.000 0.247 0.009 0.000 0.214 0.009 0.000 0.225 0.010 0.000
Mother's income. log 0.002 0.001 0.258 0.001 0.001 0.514 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.292 0.006 0.001 0.000
Father's income. log 0.002 0.001 0.232 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.085 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.001
Constant 1.559 0.068 0.000 1.654 0.066 0.000 1.479 0.070 0.000 1.466 0.076 0.000 1.377 0.082 0.000
N 189272.0 196661.0 191333.0 185294.0 183170.0
Wald Chi2 98.95 193.3 417.34 645.89 617.46
LogLikelihood 69208.23 70979.56 68646.77 67223.99 61275.73
Table A3
Second stage selection estimation: Decision to purchase an ethanol car.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Coef. Std.Err P4z Coef. Std.Err P4z Coef. Std.Err P4z Coef. Std.Err P4z Coef. Std.Err P4z
Owned car t-1 0.398 0.519 0.443 0.090 0.374 0.810 0.292 0.287 0.309 0.719 0.277 0.009 0.168 0.187 0.370
Stockholm 0.003 0.101 0.973 0.246 0.087 0.005 0.197 0.065 0.003 0.319 0.048 0.000 0.239 0.044 0.000
Sthlm city center 0.455 0.182 0.012 0.086 0.124 0.485 0.207 0.117 0.076 0.166 0.083 0.046 0.123 0.063 0.051
Malmo city center 0.206 0.076 0.006 0.225 0.091 0.014 0.256 0.068 0.000 0.231 0.050 0.000 0.129 0.046 0.005
Gbg city center 0.083 0.061 0.171 0.040 0.061 0.515 0.092 0.048 0.053 0.098 0.035 0.005 0.106 0.031 0.001
Work in city center 1.793 0.505 0.000 2.129 0.269 0.000 2.260 0.179 0.000 1.706 0.135 0.000 1.199 0.119 0.000
Female 0.181 0.068 0.008 0.021 0.075 0.776 0.053 0.061 0.384 0.033 0.046 0.473 0.095 0.039 0.016
Age 0.022 0.023 0.341 0.023 0.023 0.308 0.026 0.017 0.135 0.033 0.013 0.014 0.024 0.011 0.036
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.265 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.004
Civil status
Married 0.046 0.074 0.528 0.071 0.074 0.339 0.086 0.066 0.194 0.203 0.053 0.000 0.148 0.045 0.001
Divorced 0.333 0.131 0.011 0.179 0.128 0.164 0.040 0.098 0.682 0.016 0.077 0.839 0.138 0.066 0.038
Widowed 3.146 108.214 0.977 0.403 0.234 0.085 0.227 0.273 0.406 0.089 0.201 0.657 0.043 0.178 0.812
N. children (0–18) in hh 0.004 0.033 0.908 0.089 0.036 0.012 0.073 0.027 0.007 0.069 0.021 0.001 0.019 0.017 0.283
Income (logged) 0.032 0.036 0.374 0.040 0.035 0.256 0.031 0.029 0.283 0.111 0.029 0.000 0.049 0.018 0.007
Education
High school 0.174 0.098 0.075 0.200 0.126 0.111 0.187 0.081 0.021 0.048 0.054 0.379 0.096 0.046 0.037
College. less than 3 years 0.316 0.131 0.016 0.557 0.146 0.000 0.457 0.104 0.000 0.215 0.077 0.005 0.379 0.064 0.000
Bachelor degree 0.344 0.100 0.001 0.588 0.126 0.000 0.509 0.081 0.000 0.395 0.055 0.000 0.392 0.047 0.000
Post graduate degree 0.454 0.186 0.014 0.599 0.206 0.004 0.772 0.133 0.000 0.484 0.104 0.000 0.559 0.099 0.000
IncomenLive in Sthlm 0.049 0.065 0.451 0.002 0.046 0.960 0.011 0.036 0.760 0.069 0.034 0.044 0.010 0.023 0.667
Country of birth
Scandinavia except Sweden 0.151 0.137 0.271 0.091 0.186 0.624 0.025 0.123 0.841 0.230 0.104 0.028 0.102 0.085 0.230
Europe except Scandinavia 0.011 0.238 0.962 0.115 0.198 0.563 0.025 0.156 0.875 0.144 0.132 0.274 0.053 0.107 0.621
North America 3.382 1030.819 0.997 0.217 0.407 0.594 0.032 0.416 0.939 0.026 0.264 0.921 0.129 0.252 0.610
Other country of origin 0.078 0.109 0.472 0.370 0.142 0.009 0.125 0.081 0.124 0.410 0.064 0.000 0.117 0.049 0.018
Unemployed 0.013 0.105 0.898 0.136 0.121 0.262 0.117 0.098 0.234 0.061 0.082 0.457 0.182 0.082 0.027
Student 0.288 0.291 0.322 0.116 0.194 0.549 0.044 0.151 0.771 0.042 0.132 0.748 0.339 0.144 0.019
Premature pensioner 0.186 0.145 0.201 0.269 0.171 0.115 0.274 0.115 0.017 0.181 0.081 0.025 0.177 0.069 0.010
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Table A3 (continued )
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Coef. Std.Err P4z Coef. Std.Err P4z Coef. Std.Err P4z Coef. Std.Err P4z Coef. Std.Err P4z
Pensioner 0.059 0.107 0.583 0.047 0.114 0.679 0.118 0.081 0.143 0.012 0.060 0.847 0.014 0.054 0.797
Partner owns car 0.097 0.080 0.223 0.150 0.078 0.054 0.135 0.065 0.036 0.101 0.046 0.028 0.100 0.042 0.018
Mother's income. log 0.004 0.009 0.695 0.013 0.010 0.188 0.005 0.007 0.487 0.008 0.005 0.163 0.015 0.005 0.002
Father's income. log 0.008 0.009 0.380 0.024 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.319 0.005 0.005 0.301 0.009 0.005 0.040
Constant 1.947 0.704 0.006 2.888 0.627 0.000 2.182 0.541 0.000 1.799 0.440 0.000 1.369 0.361 0.000
/athrho 0.459 0.168 0.006 0.140 0.179 0.434 0.195 0.139 0.162 0.359 0.101 0.000 0.417 0.096 0.000
Rho 0.429 0.137 0.139 0.176 0.192 0.134 0.344 0.089 0.395 0.081
N 189272 196661 191333 185294 183170
Wald chi2 98.950 193.300 417.340 645.890 617.460
LogLik 69208 70980 68647 67224 61276
LR test (rho¼0): p¼0.0096 p¼0.4261 p¼0.1704 p¼0.0006 p¼0.0000
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